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Recently an orthogonal state based protocol of direct quantum communication without actual
transmission of particles is proposed by Salih et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 110 (2013) 170502] using
chained quantum Zeno effect. As the no-transmission of particle claim is criticized by Vaidman
[arXiv:1304.6689 (2013)], the condition (claim) of Salih et al. is weaken here to the extent that
transmission of particles is allowed, but transmission of the message qubits (the qubits on which the
secret information is encoded) is not allowed. Remaining within this weaker condition it is shown
that there exists a large class of quantum states, that can be used to implement an orthogonal
state based protocol of secure direct quantum communication using entanglement swapping, where
actual transmission of the message qubits is not required. The security of the protocol originates
from monogamy of entanglement. As the protocol can be implemented without using conjugate
coding its security is independent of non-commutativity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The need of secrecy is eternal. From the beginning of
human civilization several methods of secure communi-
cation have been proposed and implemented. However,
until the appearance of quantum cryptography, none of
the methods/protocols of secure communication was un-
conditionally secure. First ever unconditionally secure
protocol of quantum key distribution (QKD) was intro-
duced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. Since this
pioneering work on quantum cryptography several other
protocols of secure quantum communication have been
proposed to date. Interestingly, applicability of all the
early protocols of secure quantum communication [1–4],
were limited to QKD. However, it was realized very soon
that quantum states can be employed for other more
general cryptographic tasks, too. For example, in 1999
Hillery et al. introduced a protocol for quantum secret
sharing (QSS) of classical secrets [5]. Almost simultane-
ously, a protocol for deterministic secure quantum com-
munication (DSQC) was proposed by Shimizu and Imoto
[6]. Eventually the protocol of Shimizu and Imoto was
found to be insecure in its original form. However, it
suggested that there may exists a protocol of quantum
communication that can circumvent prior generation of
keys (i.e., QKD) and thus it may lead to unconditionally
secure direct quantum communication. Subsequently,
many such protocols have been proposed. Such proto-
cols can broadly be divided into two classes: (a) proto-
cols for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC)
[7–10] and (b) protocols for DSQC [11–18].
In a secure direct quantum communication protocol if
receiver (Bob) requires a pre-key to read out the secret
message sent by the sender (Alice) then the protocol is
referred to as DSQC protocol, otherwise (i.e., if no such
pre-key is required) the protocol is referred to as QSDC
protocol. Specifically, in a DSQC protocol Bob can de-
code the secret message sent by Alice only after receipt
of additional classical information of at least one bit for
each qubit transmitted by Alice [19]. In the present pa-
per we aim to design a new orthogonal state based DSQC
protocol. Before we do so it would be interesting to note
that all DSQC protocols can be transformed to protocols
of QKD. It is easy to convert a QSDC/DSQC protocol
into a protocol of QKD by using a random number gen-
erator. Specifically, if we assume that the sender (Alice)
possesses a random number generator and she transmits
the outcome of the random number generator to Bob,
then any QSDC/DSQC protocol would reduce to a pro-
tocol of QKD. Thus if we can establish that an orthogonal
state based DSQC protocol can be realized by using any
member of a family of quantum states, then that would
imply that QKD can also be realized using these quantum
states. Further, in a conventional QKD protocol we gen-
erate an unconditionally secure key by quantum means
and subsequently use classical cryptographic resources to
encode the secret message. No such classical means are
required in DSQC and QSDC. This makes these proto-
cols purely quantum mechanical.
The unconditional security of majority of the exist-
ing protocols of DSQC, QSDC and QKD arise from the
conjugate coding. Only recently we have shown that con-
jugate coding is not essential for DSQC [20, 21]. Subse-
quently, Salih et al. have also proposed an orthogonal
state based protocol of DSQC [22]. Here we provide an-
other orthogonal state based protocol of DSQC. The pro-
tocol presented here is a Goldenberg-Vaidman (GV) type
[4] protocol of DSQC, that uses only orthogonal states
for encoding, decoding and error checking, as was done
in the original GV protocol of QKD. Interestingly, GV
protocol was introduced in 1995, but for many years it
remained isolated as the only orthogonal-state-based pro-
tocol of QKD. Finally in 2009 another orthogonal state
based protocol known as N09 protocol [23] was proposed
by T.-G. Noh. These two orthogonal state based pro-
tocols are fundamentally different from the other conju-
gate coding based (BB84 type) protocols for several rea-
sons. Most importantly, security of these two protocols
2does not depend on noncommutativity. Consequently,
they are extremely important from the foundational per-
spectives. Importance of orthogonal-state-based proto-
cols are not limited to foundational aspects only, they
are also of practical importance as they are experimen-
tally realizable [24–27]. To be precise, recently GV pro-
tocol is experimentally realized [24]. A set of successful
implementation of N09 protocol are also reported [25–
27]. The foundational importance and the recent exper-
imental achievements have motivated us to investigate
the power of orthogonal state based protocols from var-
ious aspects. Recently, we have shown that the security
of both GV and N09 protocols arise from duality [20].
We have also generalized the GV protocol to GV-type
DSQC and QSDC protocols. Our Bell-state-based gen-
eralizations of original GV protocol may also be regarded
as the first instance of GV-type DSQC and QSDC proto-
cols [20]. We have also shown that maximally efficient or-
thogonal state based protocol of DSQC and QSDC can be
designed with arbitrary quantum states [21]. The foun-
dational importance and the recent experimental achieve-
ments have also motivated others to generalize N09 pro-
tocol to a protocol of secure direct quantum communica-
tion. To be precise, recently Salih et al. have provided a
very interesting protocol of direct counterfactual quan-
tum communication [22] using chained quantum Zeno
effect. They claimed that direct quantum communica-
tion between Alice and Bob is possible without actual
transmission of particles between them. This claim is
criticized by Vaidman [28], who argued that actual mea-
surement of the presence of the qubits in transmission
channel contradicts the claim of Salih et al. The argu-
ment of Vaidman motivates us to weaken the claim of
Salih et al. (i.e., the condition imposed by Salih et al.)
and to investigate the possibility of designing a protocol
of DSQC under the condition that transmission of parti-
cles are allowed but transmission of information encoded
qubits are not allowed. This condition is referred to as
weak condition. Remaining within this weak condition
we have proposed an entanglement swapping based pro-
tocol of DSQC.
In the protocol proposed in this paper, the rearrange-
ment of order of particles, plays an important role.
DSQC protocol based on this technique was first pro-
posed by Zhu et al. [16] in 2006. However, it was found
to be insecure under a Trojan-horse attack, and was cor-
rected by Li et al. [12]. The Li et al. protocol may thus
be considered as the first unconditionally secure protocol
of DSQC based on permutation of particles (PoP). Since
the work of Li et al., many PoP-based protocols of DSQC
have been proposed. Very recently, Banerjee and Pathak
[29], Shukla, Banerjee and Pathak [30], Shukla, Pathak
and Srikanth [21], Yuan et al. [18] and Tsai et al. [31]
have proposed PoP-based protocols for both DSQC and
QSDC. The Yuan et al. protocol and Shukla-Banerjee-
Pathak protocol use 4-qubit symmetric W state for com-
munication, while the Banerjee-Pathak protocol uses 3-
qubit GHZ-like states, Shukla-Pathak-Srikanth protocol
uses arbitrary quantum states [21], and the Tsai et al.
protocol utilizes the dense coding of four-qubit cluster
states. In all these protocols the qubits on which Alice en-
codes a message travel through the quantum channel. In
contrast, no such transmission happens in recently pro-
posed Zhang et al. [32] protocol and Salih et al. protocol
[22]. Extending their ideas [22, 32] we aim to show that
there exists a class of quantum states that may be used
to implement GV type protocol of DSQC that would be
free from transmission of information encoded qubits.
The remaining part of the present paper is organized
as follows, in Section II we describe the general form of a
set of quantum states that may be used for DSQC using
entanglement swapping. In this section it is indicated
that this set of quantum states can be used to design
entanglement swapping based protocol of DSQC. A set of
well known quantum states are also shown to be member
of this set of quantum states. In Section III, we describe
a general GV type orthogonal state based protocol of
DSQC that can be implemented using any quantum state
of the family described in Section II. An explicit example
of the protocol is also provided using GHZ-like state.
In Section IV security and efficiency of the protocol is
discussed and finally the paper is concluded in Section
V.
II. GENERAL FORM OF THE QUANTUM
STATE
We are interested to design a protocol of DSQC that
can transmit an n-bit message using the quantum states
of the form
|ψ〉 = 1√
2n
2n∑
i=1
|ei〉|fi〉, (1)
where {|ei〉} is a basis set in C2m : m ≥ n and each of
the basis vector is m qubit maximally entangled state
(consequently, m ≥ 2), and {|fi〉} is a basis set in
C2
l
: l ≥ n ≥ 1. It is not essential for the basis ele-
ments of {|fi〉} to be in entangled state. Thus |ψ〉 is a
m + l qubit state. Since {|ei〉} and {|fi〉} are basis set,
i 6= i′ implies that |ei〉 6= |ei′〉 and |fi〉 6= |fi′〉. This in
turn ensures that |ψ〉 is an entangled state. In general
we demand |ei〉 as maximally entangled m-qubit state.
However, for the convenience of proof we restrict our-
selves to a specific case where |ei〉 is a m-qubit cat state.
Now we assume that the quantum state |ψ〉 described in
(1) is prepared by Alice. She keeps first m qubits with
herself and sends the remaining l qubits to Bob in a non-
clonable manner. By non-clonable manner we mean that
Alice sends the qubits to Bob in such a way that Eve
cannot clone the state |fi〉. Meaning of this will be elab-
orated in what follows. Further, imagine that Alice has
prepared another cat state |ej〉 of same dimension, then
3the combined state |ej〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 can be expressed as
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2n
2n∑
i=1
|ej〉|ei〉|fi〉 = |ej〉
(
1√
2n
2n∑
i=1
|ei〉|fi〉
)
.
(2)
In what follows we will see that Alice encodes a secret
j by creating |ej〉. Thus the index j corresponds to a
secret bit string indexed by j. From (2), it is clear that
in |ψ1〉 the first m qubits (i.e., the qubits of |ej〉) are
separable from the rest of the qubits. Consequently, any
measurement on rest of the qubits will not reveal any
information about the state of the first m qubits. Let us
see what happens if we allow Alice to do entanglement
swapping among first 2m qubits of this combined state
(2). Specifically, we are interested to see the effect of
entanglement swapping on |ej〉|ei〉. To do so, Alice may
follow the following prescription. She takes first p = m2
qubits from both the cat states (i.e., |ej〉 and |ei〉) if m
is even, otherwise she takes p = m−12 qubits from both|ej〉 and |ei〉. Thus Alice has a set of 2p qubits (this set
is referred to as first set) and another set of 2 (m− p)
qubits (this set is referred to as second set).
Before we proceed further, the notations used here can
be made more precise using the convention used in [33].
Following [33] we can express an m-qubit cat sate in gen-
eral as
|e〉 = 1√
2
(
m∏
k=1
|uk〉 ±
m∏
k=1
|uck〉
)
, (3)
where the symbols uk stands for binary variable ∈ {0, 1}
with uck = 1 − uk. The state of our interest (2) is a
finite superposition of products of two cat states. Let
each of these cat sates be labeled by q, where q = 1, 2,
and the kth particle of the lth cat state is labeled by
k(l). This summarizes the notation used here. Now it is
straightforward to recognize that the set of all cat states
of 2p qubits forms a complete orthonormal basis set and
using the notation described here the elements of such a
basis set can be expressed as
|ψ(2p)〉 =
2∏
q=1
p∏
k=1
|uk(q)〉 ±
2∏
q=1
p∏
k=1
|uck(q)〉. (4)
Now we imagine that Alice performs a projective mea-
surement on the first set of qubits using cat basis of 2p
dimension. The measurement on this basis implies that
we operate |ψ(2p)〉〈ψ(2p)| on |ψ1〉. The operation would
collapse the first set of qubits into one of the cat states
in 2p dimension. Remaining (2m− 2p) qubits of |ej〉|ei〉
will be projected to a (2m−2p) cat state of the form [33]
|ψ(2m− 2p)〉 =
2∏
q=1
m∏
k=p+1
|uk(q)〉 ±
2∏
q=1
m∏
k=p+1
|uck(q)〉. (5)
The structure of (2) would ensure that the initial en-
tanglement present between |ei〉 and |fi〉 (more precisely
between first m particles and last l particles of |ψ〉)
is now transferred between the (2m − 2p) particles of
|ψ(2m− 2p)〉 and l particles of |fi〉.
Now if we consider a protocol in which Alice sends the
last l qubits (i.e., qubits of |fi〉) to Bob and measures the
first 2p qubits in 2p-qubit cat basis and the remaining
(2m−2p) qubits of her possession in (2m−2p)-qubit cat
basis and announces the outcomes, then Bob will be able
to infer what was |ej〉 (equivalently the secret encoded
by Alice which is indexed by j) by measuring his qubits
in {|fi〉} basis and using the outcomes of Alice’s mea-
surement. Thus it leads to a protocol of direct quantum
communication.
At a first glance any protocol designed along the above
line of arguments does not appear to be secure as {|fi〉} is
orthogonal and measurement outcomes of Alice are pub-
lic knowledge. Conventionally, orthogonal states can be
perfectly measured and thus cloned. A measurement by
Eve in {|fi〉} basis will destroy the entanglement, but Al-
ice and Bob will not be able to trace Eve if they apply
the above idea without using any strategy for eavesdrop-
ping check. Further, if Eve is allowed to measure the
states communicated by Alice in {|fi〉} basis then she
is also capable to clone the states [34] and the protocol
would fail. However, it is possible to design strategy in
which orthogonal states are communicated in such a way
that Eve does not have access to the basis set in which
the communicated states are basis elements (i.e., the ba-
sis set in which the communicated states are perfectly
measurable). This restriction on the basis sets available
to Eve implies nocloning [34] and when orthogonal states
are communicated using such a strategy then we say that
the states are communicated in a non-clonable manner.
To communicate the orthogonal states of {|fi〉} basis in
a non-clonable manner we need to ensure that Eve does
not have access to {|fi〉} basis. This is possible in several
ways. For example, non-clonable communication is pos-
sible if the physical realization of all the states in {|fi〉}
basis are such that they may be visualized as superpo-
sition of two or more pieces that can be geographically
separated. For example, in the original GV protocol [4],
orthogonal states |φ0〉 = |a〉 + |b〉 and |φ1〉 = |a〉 − |b〉
are used to communicate bit values 0 and 1, respectively,
but Alice used to send the wave packet |b〉 to Bob only
after wavepacket |a〉 is received by Bob. This strategy
implies that Eve does not have simultaneous access to
|a〉 and |b〉 and as a consequence Eve cannot perform a
measurement in {|a〉+ |b〉, |a〉−|b〉} basis. Eve’s inability
to perform a measurement in {|a〉+|b〉, |a〉−|b〉} basis im-
plies that she can neither do a perfect measurement nor
perform cloning operation [34]. Thus in the GV protocol
orthogonal states are communicated in a non-clonable
manner. We are not interested to follow original GV
idea to communicate |fi〉 in a non-clonable manner as
GV idea requires strict time checking which is difficult
to achieve experimentally. Some of the present authors
[20, 21] have recently generalized the GV idea and have
suggested another strategy of non-clonable communica-
4tion of orthogonal states by using the fact that entangled
states are nothing but superposition in tensor product
space. In our procedure strict time checking is not re-
quired [20]. To be precise, Alice can concatenate a set
of decoy qubits prepared in Bell states (say Alice pre-
pares |ψ+〉⊗N2 =
(
|00〉+|11〉√
2
)⊗N
2
) with a N -qubit string
that she wants to transmit to Bob and randomly rear-
range the particle ordering i.e., apply PoP technique and
thus restrict the basis available to Eve. PoP will ensure
that Eve cannot clone or measure the decoy qubits as
she does not know which qubits are mutually entangled.
Further Eve will not be able to selectively clone or mea-
sure non-decoy qubits as after application of PoP, she
has no way to isolate decoy qubits from the other qubits.
As perfect measurement by Eve is not possible due to
unavailability of {|fi〉} basis, any measurement and/or
cloning attempt by Eve will leave a signature, that can
be traced by measuring and comparing the decoy qubits.
In summary, Alice can always communicate last l qubits
of (1) to Bob in a non-clonable manner and that in turn
ensures protection against measurement and resend at-
tack and cloning (CNOT) attack. Above facts lead us to
a protocol of DSQC using entanglement swapping where
actual transmission of the information encoded particles
are not required. The protocol is elaborated on Section
III.
A. Some special cases of the quantum state
Till now it may not be very easy to visualize: How
general the state (1) is? So here we note some spe-
cial cases of this general state (1). Let us start with
the simplest case m = 2, n = 1 and l = 1. For
m = 2, the obvious choice of maximally entangled basis
set is Bell basis {|ei〉} = {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉}, where
ψ± = |00〉±|11〉√
2
and φ± = |01〉±|10〉√
2
. For n = 1, we need
only 2 basis vectors from the set {|ei〉}. Let us choose
|e1〉 = |ψ+〉, |e2〉 = |ψ−〉, now if we choose |f1〉 = |0〉 and
|f2〉 = |1〉, then |ψ〉 = 1√2 (|ψ+0〉+ |ψ−1〉), which is a
GHZ-like state [35]. Here we can easily recognize that
all GHZ-like states are actually of the form (1). Alter-
natively, if we choose |e1〉 = |ψ+〉, |e2〉 = |ψ−〉 and |f1〉 =
|+〉 and |f2〉 = |−〉, then |ψ〉 = 1√2 (|ψ++〉+ |ψ−−〉) =
1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉), which is a GHZ state. Similarly we
can show that all other GHZ states are also of the form
(1). In the Table I we have provided some more examples
of well known quantum states which are of the form (1).
Thus if we can show that (1) can be used for DSQC of
n−bit classical information then that would mean that
we have a large class of states that can be used for DSQC
without actual transmission of message encoded states.
III. ORTHOGONAL STATE BASED PROTOCOL
OF DSQC
The protocol in general works as follows:
Step 1: Alice prepares |ψ〉⊗N . She keeps the first m
qubits of each |ψ〉 with herself and prepares a se-
quence PB with the remaining l qubits. Thus PB
is a sequence of Nl qubits.
Step 2: Alice communicates PB to Bob in a non-
clonable manner. To communicate PB in non-
clonable manner Alice prepares |ψ+〉⊗Nl2 as decoy
(checking) qubits and concatenates the qubits into
PB to obtain a longer sequence P
′
B , which has total
2Nl qubits. Subsequently, Alice applies a random
permutation operator Π2Nl on P
′
B to obtain a new
sequence P ′′B = Π2NlP
′
B and sends that to Bob.
Step 3: Alice discloses Π2Nl (which includes the coor-
dinates of the Bell pairs) after receiving authentic
acknowledgment of receipt of all the photons from
Bob.
Step 4: Bob rearranges the sequence and measures the
transmitted Bell pairs (that are prepared as decoy
qubits) in the Bell basis to determine if they are
in the state |ψ+〉. If the error detected by Bob
is within a tolerable limit, they continue to the
next step. Otherwise, they discard the protocol
and restart from Step 1.
Step 5: Alice encodes her n-bit message as follows:
She encodes 0102 · · · 0n, 0102 · · · 1n, · · · , 1112 · · · 1n
as |e1〉, |e2〉, · · · , |en〉 respectively and combines the
encoded state with |ψ〉. Now if Alice encodes a se-
cret message j then the complete state of the sys-
tem is
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2n
2n∑
i=1
|ej〉|ei〉|fi〉,
whose first 2m qubits are with Alice and the last l
qubits are with Bob.
Step 6: Alice performs entanglement swapping opera-
tion as described above (see Section II) and an-
nounces her measurement outcomes.
Step 7: Bob measures his qubits in {|fi〉} basis. From
his measurement outcomes and from the announce-
ment of Alice, he can decode the information en-
coded by Alice.
A. A special case: Implementation of the protocol
using GHZ-like state
Assume that Alice and Bob have agreed on the fol-
lowing encoding. If Alice has to send 0 (1) then she will
encode it as |ψ+〉 (|ψ−〉).
51. Alice prepares N copies of a GHZ-like
state 1√
2
(|ψ+0〉+ |ψ−1〉), i.e., Alice prepares
1√
2n
(|ψ+0〉+ |ψ−1〉)⊗N . She keeps the first two
photons with herself and prepares a sequence PB
with all the third qubits.
2. Then Alice prepares |ψ+〉⊗N2 and concatenates the
qubits into PB to obtain a larger sequence P
′
B,
which has total 2N qubits. Now Alice applies a
random permutation operator Π2N on P
′
B to ob-
tain a new sequence P ′′B and sends that to Bob.
3. Alice discloses Π2N (which includes the coordinates
of the Bell pairs) after receiving authentic acknowl-
edgment of receipt of all the photons from Bob.
4. Bob rearranges the sequence and measures the
transmitted Bell pairs in the Bell basis to deter-
mine if they are in the state |ψ+〉. If the error de-
tected is within the tolerable limit, they continue to
the next step. Otherwise, they discard the protocol
and restart from Step 1.
5. After confirmation that no eavesdropping has
happened, Alice encodes her message qubit.
Now the complete state of the system is
1√
2
(|ψ±〉|ψ+0〉+ |ψ±〉|ψ−1〉)12345 . Here the qubits
1-4 are with Alice and the last qubit is with Bob.
6. Now Alice does Bell measurements on qubits 1,3
and 2,4 and announces her result.
7. Bob measures his qubit in computational basis. Us-
ing his measurement outcome and the announce-
ment of Alice, he can decode the information en-
coded by Alice.
Let’s see how Bob can decode the information. First we
assume that Alice has encoded 0, then the combined state
can be decomposed as
1√
2
(|ψ+ψ+0〉+ |ψ+ψ−1〉)12345 = 12√2 [{|ψ+ψ+〉+ |φ+φ+〉+ |φ−φ−〉+ |ψ−ψ−〉}1324 |0〉5
+ {|ψ+ψ−〉 − |φ+φ−〉 − |φ−φ+〉+ |ψ−ψ+〉}1324 |1〉5] .
(6)
Similarly, if Alice encodes 1, then the combined state is
1√
2
(|ψ−ψ+0〉+ |ψ−ψ−1〉)12345 = 12√2 [{|ψ+ψ−〉+ |φ+φ−〉+ |φ−φ+〉+ |ψ−ψ+〉}1324 |0〉5
+ {|ψ+ψ+〉 − |φ+φ+〉 − |φ−φ−〉+ |ψ−ψ−〉}1324 |1〉5]
(7)
Now from the above two equations it is clear that us-
ing the announcement of measurement outcomes of Al-
ice and the outcome of his own measurement Bob will
be able to decode the encoded information. For clarity
we have shown the relation among Alice’s measurement
outcomes, Bob’s measurement outcomes and Bob’s con-
clusions in Table II. Similar expansion and subsequently
tables relating Alice’s outcome, Bob’s outcome and en-
coded bit string can be obtained for other quantum states
of the generic form (1). For example, we can easily obtain
such tables for all other quantum states listed in Table I.
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No.
(l, m,n) {|ei〉} {|fi〉} |ψ〉 =
1√
2n
∑2n
i=1
|ei〉|fi〉 The state is
known as
1. (2, 2, 1) {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉} {|00〉, |11〉, |01〉, |10〉}
1√
2
(
|ψ+00〉 + |ψ−11〉
)
= 1
2
(|0000〉 + |0011〉
+ |1100〉 − |1111〉)
1234
Cluster
state
2. (2, 2, 2) {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉} {|ψ−〉, |ψ+〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉}
1
2
(
|ψ+ψ−〉+ |ψ−ψ+〉
+ |φ+φ+〉+ |φ−φ−〉
)
= 1
2
(|0000〉 + |0101〉
+ |1010〉 − |1111〉)
1324
Cluster
state after
swapping of
particles 2
and 3
3. (2, 2, 1) {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉} {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉} 1√
2
(
|ψ+ψ+〉+ |ψ−ψ−〉
)
4-qubit cat
state
4. (1, 2, 1) {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉} {|+〉, |−〉} 1√
2
(
|ψ++〉+ |ψ−−〉
)
GHZ state
5. (1, 2, 1) {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉} {|0〉, |1〉} 1√
2
(
|ψ+0〉+ |ψ−1〉
)
GHZ-like
state
6. (2, 3, 2)
{|G010〉, |G111〉, |G001〉, |G100〉,
|G000〉, |G011〉, |G101〉, |G110〉}
{|00〉,−|01〉, |10〉,−|11〉}
1
2
(|G010〉|00〉 − |G111〉|01〉
+|G001〉|10〉 − |G100〉|11〉)
= |ψB〉12534
Brown state
after
swapping of
particles
7. (2, 2, 2)
{
|Φ+1 〉 =
1√
2
(
|ψ+〉+ |φ−〉
)
,
|Φ−1 〉 =
1√
2
(
|ψ+〉 − |φ−〉
)
,
|Ψ+1 〉 =
1√
2
(
|φ+〉+ |ψ−〉
)
,
|Ψ−1 〉 =
1√
2
(
|φ+〉 − |ψ−〉
)}
{|0−〉, |0+〉, |1−〉, |1+〉}
1
2
(
|Φ+1 〉|0−〉+ |Φ
−
1 〉|0+〉
+ |Ψ+1 〉|1−〉+ |Ψ
−
1 〉|1+〉
)
= 1
2
√
2
(|0000〉 − |0011〉
−|0101〉 + |0110〉
+|1001〉 + |1010〉
+|1100〉 + |1111〉)
= |χ〉1234
χ state
8. (2, 2, 2) {|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉} {|ψ−〉, |ψ+〉, |φ+〉,−|φ−〉}
1
2
(
|ψ+ψ−〉+ |ψ−ψ+〉
+ |φ+φ+〉 − |φ−φ−〉
)
= 1
2
(|0000〉 + |0110〉
+|1001〉 − |1111〉)1234
Ω state
Table I: Interesting quantum states of the form (1). Here
|Gijk〉 = |0〉|j〉|k〉+ (−1)i|1〉|j ⊕ 1〉|k ⊕ 1〉, i, j, k ∈ {0, 1}
is a GHZ state.
IV. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY OF THE
PROTOCOL
In this protocol the qubits with encoded message are
not transmitted, so we just need to ensure that the first
transmission (i.e., the transmission of l qubits of |fi〉 to
Bob) is secure. As described above, while sending this
set of qubits Alice randomly inserts the decoy qubits pre-
pared in |ψ+〉⊗Nl2 and subsequently on Alice’s disclosure
of position of those qubits Bob can measure them in Bell
basis and check what % of them are still in |ψ+〉 and
use that to compute the error rate. Now we check the
protection of the protocol against some well known eaves-
dropping strategies.
Measurement and resend attack: If Eve plans to
measure the qubits of P ′′B and send the outcome to Bob,
she will always leave a signature as she does not know
which qubits are entangled with which one. As Eve has
no way to distinguish between decoy qubits and the other
qubits she will end up measuring decoy qubits, clearly
any attempt to measure the decoy qubits in a basis other
than Bell basis will destroy/modify the entanglement and
will be traced when Bob measures them. Even if Eve
measures in Bell basis, she will be traced. This can be
visualized through a simple example. Consider that Eve
measures decoy qubits |ψ+〉ab|ψ+〉cd in Bell basis but as
she is unaware of the fact that a (c) is entangled with
b (d), she measures ac and bd in Bell basis. Now as
|ψ+〉ab|ψ+〉cd = 12 {|ψ+ψ+〉+ |φ+φ+〉
+ |φ−φ−〉+ |ψ−ψ−〉}abcd ,
7Alice’s outcome Bob’s outcome Encoded bit
ψ+ψ+ 0 0
ψ+ψ+ 1 1
ψ−ψ− 0 0
ψ−ψ− 1 1
φ+φ+ 0 0
φ+φ+ 1 1
φ−φ− 0 0
φ−φ− 1 1
ψ+ψ− 0 1
ψ+ψ− 1 0
ψ−ψ+ 0 1
ψ−ψ+ 1 0
φ−φ+ 0 1
φ−φ+ 1 0
φ+φ− 0 1
φ+φ− 1 0
Table II: Relation between Alice’s outcomes, Bob’s
outcome and the encoded information.
75% of the times measurement of Eve will be detected
by Bob as he will not obtain |ψ+〉ab|ψ+〉cd as outcome of
his measurement. Similarly other situations can be in-
vestigated to show that the protocol is protected against
measurement and resend attack.
CNOT (Cloning) attack: PoP ensures that Eve
does not have access to Bell basis. So she cannot try
to clone in Bell basis. However she may try to apply
CNOT gate and use each transmitted qubit as control
qubit and prepare target qubits in |0〉. In such a case her
operation will lead to a decoy state |ψ+〉 = |00〉+|11〉√
2
to
|0000〉+|1111〉√
2
=
(|ψ+〉|ψ+〉+|ψ−〉|ψ−〉)√
2
where last two qubits
are the auxiliary qubits introduced by Eve. Now 50% of
the time Bob’s measurement will yield |ψ−〉 and Eve will
be detected. It is important to note that this is applicable
in general independent of whether elements of {|fi〉} are
entangled or separable as Eve has no way to distinguish
between a decoy qubit and other qubits so she cannot
selectively clone.
Capture and replacement attack: In principle Eve
can capture all the qubits sent by Alice and prepare
fake states |ψ〉 = 1√
2n
∑2n
i=1 |ei〉|fi〉 and |ψ+〉⊗
Nl
2 and use
them to prepare a fake P ′′B . This strategy would fail as the
permutation operator randomly rearranges the qubits, so
while Bob will recreate the sequence after Alices’s disclo-
sure of ΠNl he will obtain a sequence that is not same as
what was prepared by Eve after concatenating |ψ+〉⊗Nl2
to PB . As a consequence Bob’s measuremet outcomes will
not always be |ψ+〉.
We have seen that the protocol is protected against
several eavesdropping attacks. This is expected as the
strategy adopted here restricts the basis set available to
Eve. Further, we would like to note that announcements
made by Alice do not disclose any information. This can
be visualized quickly if we note that |fi〉 can be found in
2n different states and as Eve is completely unaware of
|fi〉, her ignorance is of log2 2n = n bits which is the same
as the amount of information encoded through |ej〉. Thus
Alice’s disclosure does not reduce the uncertainty of Eve.
In the existing entanglement swapping based DSQC pro-
tocols [36] conjugate coding based techniques that rely
on BB84 kind of eavesdropping checking are used. Thus
the security of those protocols essentially arise from non-
commutativity. In contrast to the existing protocols our
protocol is completely orthogonal state based (GV type)
protocol and its security arises from monogamy [20, 21].
Qubit efficiency η is used for analysis of efficiency of
DSQC and QSDC protocols. It is defined as [37]
η =
c
q + b
, (8)
where c denotes the total number of transmitted classical
bits (message bits), q denotes the total number of qubits
used and b is the number of classical bits exchanged for
decoding of the message (classical communications used
for checking of eavesdropping is not counted). In our
case |ψ〉 is a m + l qubit state and in addition we need
to add l decoy qubits [29] and m qubits for entanglement
swapping. So q = 2m+2l. Now this state can be used to
communicate n bit of classical information which implies
c = n. In addition Alice has to disclose her measurement
outcomes by transmitting 2m bit classical information.
Therefore
η =
n
2m+ 2l+ 2m
=
1
2
(
n
2m+ l
)
.
Now in the limiting case when m = n = l then the
qubit efficiency η = 16 = 16.6% is maximum but this
value is lower compared to the maximum possible value
of η = 13 = 33.33% [29]. The difference arises from the
definition of q, if instead of total number of qubits we
use q = total number of qubits transmitted then in the
limiting case m = n = l the efficiency of the proposed
protocol is 25%. Still its not maximally efficient. Thus
the most interesting feature of the present protocol that
the message encoded states are not transmitted is asso-
ciated with a cost as it reduces the efficiency.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is shown that DSQC is possible without actual trans-
mission of message string and the task can be performed
with any member of a set of quantum states having
generic form (1). The proposed protocol is based on
Bose et al.’s idea of generalized entanglement swapping
[33], and it is a GV-type orthogonal state based protocol
of DSQC. We have also elaborated the working of the
protocol by considering a special case where the initial
state is a GHZ-like state. The protocol is different from
most of the conventional DSQC protocols for the follow-
ing three reasons: (1) It is an orthogonal state based pro-
tocol and except our recent proposals [20, 21] and Salih et
8al. protocol [22] all other existing protocols of DSQC are
based on conjugate coding. (2) In the proposed protocol
actual information encoded quantum state never prop-
agates through the transmission channel. (3) Whereas
the security of conventional QSDC and DSQC protocols,
like that of BB84-class QKD protocols, is based on con-
jugate coding, the security of the present GV-type DSQC
protocols is based on monogamy of entanglement.
Present work provides a protocol of DSQC that is sim-
ilar to the protocol of Salih et al. in the sense that
its security does not arise from noncommutativity and
message qubits are not transmitted. Interestingly, criti-
cism of Vaidman is not applicable to the present proto-
col as transmission of non-message qubits happens in the
present protocol and thus it works in a weaker condition
than that claimed by Salih et al. [22]. Further, recently
proposed Zhang et al. [32] protocol may be viewed as a
special case of our protocol. This point is explicitly illus-
trated through Example 2 of Table I where we show that
the 4-qubit cluster state used by Zhang et al. is a spe-
cial case of the quantum state (1). The state described
here and the proposed protocol is much more general. In
Table I, we have provided 8 examples of quantum state
of the form (1) that may be used for implementation of
DSQC using the protocol presented here. The list can be
extended arbitrarily as we can generate infinitely many
quantum states of the form (1). However, a protocol
is useful if and only if that can be implemented using
the quantum states that can be generated experimen-
tally using the contemporary facilities. Interestingly, all
the states listed in Table I can be generated in modern
laboratories and their generations are reported in recent
past.
The protocol is shown to be unconditionally secure. It
is also noted that the security of the protocol arises from
non-realistic nature of quantum mechanics. Interestingly
it is found that the protocol is not maximally efficient
as far as its qubit efficiency is considered. This inter-
esting and completely orthogonal state based protocol is
expected to be of much use in all future experimental de-
velopments as it provides a wide choice of quantum states
to experimentalists.
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